SHARKFEST 2015

WIRESHARK DEVELOPER AND USER CONFERENCE

Analyzing Huge Data for Suspicious Traffic

Christian Landström, Airbus DS

Topics

- Overview on security infrastructure
- Strategies for network defense
- A look at malicious traffic incl. Demos
- How Wireshark can help



House rules

Tool-Box

Defaults:

Proxy servers with authentication
Logging, Monitoring, (SIEM)

Layers of Defense:
Firewalls / WAFs
Intrusion Detection / Intrusion Prevention
NIDS/NIPS/HIDS/HIPS
Malware Sensors / Sandboxing / “APT-devices”

Overview on sec. infrastructure

- Depending on
  - → area of protection
  - → type of attack

- External: Internet facing
- Internal: non-Inet facing



External I



Typical protection for DMZ systems:
Packet filter → IPS / APT device → local (host-)firewall



Demo #1: DMZ Service

- Monitoring the request size in this example reveals some huge request resulting in a new connection initiated by the FTP Server

Source	Destination	Protocol	Size	Info
192.168.163.130	192.168.163.128	TCP	74	41779→21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.130	FTP	108	Response: 220 3Com 3CDaemon FTP Server Version 2.0
192.168.163.130	192.168.163.128	FTP	1000	Request: USER 5FFy8o^Geersu!2E,ND3?[4gz)M5V,cC_MzJuMv}a]1C<*[mF
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.130	TCP	62	1086→4444 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
192.168.163.1	192.168.163.128	TCP	66	56571→21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	96	Response: 220 3Com 3CDaemon FTP Server Version 2.0
192.168.163.1	192.168.163.128	FTP	70	Request: USER anonymous
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	87	Response: 331 User name ok, need password
192.168.163.1	192.168.163.128	FTP	75	Request: PASS anon@anon.anon
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	74	Response: 230 User logged in
192.168.163.1	192.168.163.128	FTP	60	Request: SYST
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	73	Response: 215 UNIX Type: L8
192.168.163.1	192.168.163.128	FTP	60	Request: FEAT
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	76	Response: 211- Feature listing
192.168.163.128	192.168.163.1	FTP	88	Response: MDTM

Demo #1: DMZ Service

Knowing your applications' behavior may lead to valid thresholds to reveal anomalies e.g. based on packet length, payload entropy or other factors



External II



Perimeter defense: Monitoring all protocols

- Know your systems' configuration
- In-depth understanding of App behavior
- Monitor the events from sec. devices
- Correlate events after sec. alert

→ WebServer accessing other servers after "unsuccessful" exploit?

Demo #2: “Encrypted” sessions

Watch for protocol anomalies e.g. missing HTTP dissector information on HTTP ports containing no valid requests or malformed data

rel.Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Size	Info
0.00000000	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	62	1178→80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 L
0.00027700	192.168.131.129	192.168.131.99	TCP	62	80→1178 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
0.00033200	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	54	1178→80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=6
0.01877300	192.168.131.129	192.168.131.99	TCP	58	80→1178 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
0.13445500	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	54	1178→80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=5 Win=6

```
00 0c 29 94 82 d4 00 0c  29 74 9c 34 08 00 45 00   ..)..... )t.4..E.
00 2c 0b fe 40 00 40 06  a6 98 c0 a8 83 81 c0 a8   .,..@.@. ........
83 63 00 50 04 9a c2 52  31 7e fe 04 11 52 50 18   .c.P...R 1~...RP.
72 10 a2 6f 00 00 0b 01  00 00                     r..o.... ..
```

Demo #2: “Encrypted” sessions

Another example for pretended encrypted traffic not containing a valid SSL handshake

```
Sample: Using relative Sequence numbers try:
tshark –r <tracefile> -Y "tcp.dstport==443 and
tcp.len > 0 and tcp.seq == 1 and !ssl.record"
```

rel.Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Size	Info
0.00000000	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	62	1178→443 [SYN] Seq=0
0.00027700	192.168.131.129	192.168.131.99	TCP	62	443→1178 [SYN, ACK]
0.00033200	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	54	1178→443 [ACK] Seq=1
0.01877300	192.168.131.129	192.168.131.99	SSL	58	Continuation Data
0.13445500	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	TCP	54	1178→443 [ACK] Seq=1

```
00 0c 29 94 82 d4 00 0c  29 74 9c 34 08 00 45 00   ..)..... )t.4..E.
00 2c 0b fe 40 00 40 06  a6 98 c0 a8 83 81 c0 a8   .,..@.@. ........
83 63 01 bb 04 9a c2 52  31 7e fe 04 11 52 50 18   .c.....R 1~...RP.
72 10 a1 04 00 00 0b 01  00 00                     r....... ..
```

Internal I



Incoming traffic critical and monitored

But:

Sessions going out are trusted

Mail / Web / FTP etc.

How to spot outgoing malicious stuff



Demo #3: Surfing the web

Also valid protocol requests may hint for an anomaly based on irregular behavior or other indicators

rel.Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Size	Info
134.684835	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	HTTP	293	POST //bXUZG2IZBqANwwzCWEqQ8g6flSMCjaoI-tc_1Gr8/ HTTP/1.1
134.782260	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	HTTP	293	POST //bXUZG2IZBqANwwzCWEqQ8g6flSMCjaoI-tc_1Gr8/ HTTP/1.1
134.875052	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	HTTP	293	POST //bXUZG2IZBqANwwzCWEqQ8g6flSMCjaoI-tc_1Gr8/ HTTP/1.1
135.873520	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	HTTP	293	POST //bXUZG2IZBqANwwzCWEqQ8g6flSMCjaoI-tc_1Gr8/ HTTP/1.1
136.987233	192.168.131.99	192.168.131.129	HTTP	293	POST //bXUZG2IZBqANwwzCWEqQ8g6flSMCjaoI-tc_1Gr8/ HTTP/1.1

```
00 0c 29 74 9c 34 00 0c  29 94 82 d4 08 00 45 00   ..)t.4.. ).....E.
01 17 09 6e 40 00 80 06  68 3d c0 a8 83 63 c0 a8   ...n@... h=...c..
83 81 04 85 1f 90 07 42  45 1f c7 2d 90 17 50 18   .......B E..-..P.
fa 04 27 15 00 00 50 4f  53 54 20 2f 2f 62 58 55   ..'...PO ST //bXU
5a 47 32 49 5a 42 71 41  4e 77 77 7a 43 57 45 71   ZG2IZBqA NwwzCWEq
51 38 67 36 66 6c 53 4d  43 6a 61 6f 49 2d 74 63   Q8g6flSM CjaoI-tc
5f 31 47 72 38 2f 20 48  54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d   _1Gr8/ H TTP/1.1.
0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67  65 6e 74 3a 20 4d 6f 7a   .User-Ag ent: Moz
69 6c 6c 61 2f 34 2e 30  20 28 63 6f 6d 70 61 74   illa/4.0  (compat
69 62 6c 65 3b 20 4d 53  49 45 20 36 2e 31 3b 20   ible; MS IE 6.1;
57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20  4e 54 29 0d 0a 48 6f 73   Windows  NT)..Hos
74 3a 20 31 39 32 2e 31  36 38 2e 31 33 31 2e 31   t: 192.1 68.131.1
32 39 3a 38 30 38 30 0d  0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74   29:8080. .Content
2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a  20 34 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e   -Length:  4..Conn
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20  4b 65 65 70 2d 41 6c 69   ection:  Keep-Ali
76 65 0d 0a 43 61 63 68  65 2d 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f   ve..Cach e-Contro
6c 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 63 61  63 68 65 0d 0a 50 72 61   l: no-ca che..Pra
67 6d 61 3a 20 6e 6f 2d  63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a 0d   gma: no- cache...
0a 52 45 43 56                                     .RECV
```

Internal II



Big issue: Lateral movement and other post-infection activities

- Internal scanning / enumeration
- Access to internal applications
- bruteforce attempts
- legitimate access with stolen credentials

→ Mostly depending on log files from internal sources

Baselining / Anomaly detection

Knowing your application behavior / network flows is critical to spotting malicious events

- Might be easy for default applications

  → Statistics: Conversation e.g.

- How about special applications?

Demo #4: Baselining sample

Especially difficult if application payload types unknown or difficult to baseline

```
# tshark -r Trace1.pcap -Y udp -Tfields -e data | more
4b417947534b6753414142746157357062474674596d3841524739
e1650518e41793d5abb03d
755d021f5cf975c6342cc14f84caf5e0b863
e1680231b0aee0ecbb648c0a4b14167412cbfb16356e8b6b76db
755f02cf93f622f368d2fef70bf71c5e5f85a8e297eb79795ac04f
```

Legitimate example Skype

```
# tshark -r Trace2.pcap -Y udp -Tfields -e data | more
10a6b286d9736aae21afc2ddf005f6125f66633de613a63e46
10a6b286d9736aae21afc2ddf005f6125f66633de613a63e46
10a7
10a0b286d9736aae21afc2ddf005f6125f66633de613a63e46
10b15a78
10bf281d1581812c38ee0e0d90c18f2e5458bbc25bc030b0
10a1530e1598ba7ad499afea4ca126827f07de483537d0ad14c0be
```

Malicious example Peacomm.C malware

Baselining approaches e.g. Web

Many approaches for finding unknown sources of malicious activity

Sample: domain lists -> diff approach

- Cat I : Clean or already infected
- Cat II : newly infected

Timely Diff’s -> approach new infections / applications

How Wireshark can help

- Better understanding of your application behavior
- Scripted generation of baselining data
- Long-term comparison of network traces for detecting abnormal changes
- Incident Analysis Results can lead to good rules for IDS/IPS and other appliances

Demo #5-7: How Wireshark can help

- Better understanding of your application behavior
- Scripted generation of baselining data
- Long-term comparison of network traces for detecting abnormal changes
- Incident Analysis Results can lead to good rules for IDS/IPS and other appliances

Demo #5: How Wireshark can help

DNS answers for localhost IP can lead to inactive c2c system
Beware: Also used for lots of valid reasons e.g. SPAM checking

```
tshark -r 127.0.0.x.pcap -Tfields -e dns.qry.name | grep -v -E
"(<valid1>|<valid2>)" | sort | uniq -c | more
[…]
      1 c-0.19-xxxxxxx.avqs.mcafee.com
      1 c-0.19-yyyyyyy.avqs.mcafee.com
    147 <malicious1>.is-certified.com
    148 <malicious2>.dnsalias.com
    146 <malicious3>.dyndns-ip.com
    148 <malicious4>.dyndns-office.com
    148 <malicious5>.doomdns.com
```

Demo #6-7 How Wireshark can help

<presentation only – sorry>

Monitoring Networks - Proactive

- Use NetFlow/OpenFlow to monitor meta data

Set up alerts for unusual patterns

- Use IDS/IPS with optimized signatures

Reduce false positives as much as possible

- Set up Passive DNS / Passive SSL recording servers

Helps in tracking down name resolution and certificate history

Monitoring Networks - Reactive

- Forensic analysis on full packet captures

Has to be recorded before something happened, of course

Carefully selected locations, e.g. Internet outbreaks

- Use NetFlow/OpenFlow for meta data

Long term storage for forensic searches, e.g. „where did the attacker connect to from the infected system?“

- Use IDS/IPS as custom IoC alarm system

Write custom IDS rules for known **I**ndicators **o**f **C**ompromise from Wireshark Analysis results

Detecting malicious traffic

- Forget „silver bullets“ – there is no “*showmethebadstuff*” Wireshark filter
- Attackers hide in plain sight
  - DNS, HTTP(S), FTP,...
- Filter out positives
  - E.g. Alexa 1 Million
  - Known update sites: OS, AV, Vendors

Final Words

- Network defense is a 24/7 challenge
- Attackers only need to succeed once, defenders would need 100% success

Read as: it‘s not „if“ but „when“ an attack will succeed.

Expect successful attacks on your network.

- Keep searching

It‘s a continuous task

Don‘t just wait for some alarm to go off

!! Thank you for attending !!

Questions?

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eMail:      landi@packet-foo.com
Web:        www.packet-foo.com
Twitter:    @0x6C616E6469
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